The Air Attack: Errors in the Attack Profile
Critique of the air attack, as described in The Liberty Incident.
A Top Gun looks at Jay Cristol's account of what a jet pilot can see and how a jet pilot operates.
By Bruce Charles (December 2, 2003)
All references are to the paperback, first edition, ISBN 1-57488-536-7.
The first 26 items are background information necessary for the reader to take into account in order to place Cristol's statements into the perspective of a tactical fighter pilot at the time of the attack upon the USS Liberty (1967). The writer, Bruce Charles, was a line tactical fighter pilot, an instructor pilot in tactical fighter aircraft, a test pilot, designated bomb commander, weapons officer, and his squadron's top gun during this same period. The pilot flew various aircraft comparable in performance and type of armament to the Israeli aircraft that attacked the Americans aboard the USS Liberty, killing or wounding 70% of the American crew.
1) The Israeli Air Force Day Fighter Forces were considered among the best in the world at the time they attacked the effectively unarmed USS Liberty in international waters and killed 34 Americans. In terms of pilot quality, equipment and experience in daylight operations, the Israelis were probably second only to German, British and American Combat Air Forces.
2) In addition to Israel's Air Force quality, Israeli intelligence services were also considered among the best in the world. Individuals spying for Israel were and are so pervasive that as recently as the first Bush Administration, and probably so today, a CIA employee had to report any contact (party, pub, professional, accidental or incidental) with an Israeli, or Israeli representative in the United States. Many Israeli agents hold US citizenship. It is difficult to believe Liberty's identity, location, and purpose were unknown to Israel's intelligence/war machine.
3) The attack came on the 4th day of a war long-planned and initiated by Israel. No "first mission" jitters. Highly trained crew, excellent equipment and well into the execution of the planned Six Day War.
4) The attack on the USS Liberty took place in IDEAL CONDITIONS for proper identification with unlimited ceiling and visibility at mid-day (CAVU & sun "high").
5) Best possible conditions and time for an air attack against a low-threat unsuspecting target. Much like a practice air-to-ground gunnery range mission... about like hunting cows in a stockyard.
6) Because Israel had considered herself at war for many years and had initiated this attack upon the Arab states, it is highly unlikely that pilots had not received an enormous amount of very specific target study. Target study is a basic fact of life with Fighter Pilots.
7) Rarely, except in times of actual war or a "war preparedness exercise" (ORI), does a squadron level "line" fighter pilot fly more than one time each day, and more likely would be a frequency of three times each week -- briefing, flight, and debriefing usually take about four hours. Thus, in a 40-hour week, 12 hours would be used for the three flights, leaving 24 hours for other work. This is much like the routine of a professional football team: the two hour game is preceded with lots and lots of practice and detailed analysis of films of opponent's games to determine tactics, individual and group capability, etc.
8) Fuel, maintenance and practice weapons cost too much to do more flying even in the United States Forces. Aircraft have a limited number of useful flight hours. Many fighter aircraft were initially designed for approximately one or two thousand flying-hour useful lives.
9) This leaves a lot of time to study targets that are likely to be hit in time of war. Since war was a planned certainty, it is absurd to assume that fighter pilots did not know each target of significance in a most likely and important adversary's inventory (Egypt).
10) Ships are significant targets. As a fighter pilot serving during the same period in SEA, Japan, and Korea, target study included ships of both the good and bad guys. The "Russian Trawler" was common knowledge, Silhouettes and actual photographs were standard. We even had silhouettes at various angles of the "good" and "bad" guys painted on the walls in the fighter pilots' bar.
11) The significance of target study and POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION of the target is to a Professional Fighter Pilot as running to the CORRECT GOAL is to a Super Bowl MVP aspirant -- there ain't no second chance.
12) Attacking a nation's warship in international water is significant in that it is considered an act of war against that nation.
13) Attacking a Russian ship in international water just might get you a chance to observe a significant atomic occurrence very close to your favorite bar.
14) At the time of the attack on the Liberty, Israel had Air Supremacy in the area and had defeated all significant Arab forces that had attempted to repel her surprise attack. (Pearl Harbor to the Arabs.)
15) The attack upon the USS Liberty was way out at Sea... late in the war... in international water... in a no-shooting zone... with the Liberty the only item on the horizon ... the threat was essentially nil to the attacking Israeli pilots... Plenty of TIME to POSITIVELY IDENTIFY the target.
16) The Israelis had not been attacked by anything that could be described as Naval Forces.
17) Because of the above factors alone, little credence can be given to the assertion of "fog of war" or other accidental cause for the air attack upon any neutral or friendly ship. The actual attack profile was more like a leisurely trip to an extremely well marked air-to-ground practice gunnery range.
18) The "low-threat" attack profile for the fighters was both simple and standard tactical practice:
A) Drive out at moderate altitude to the target area,
B) Visually acquire the target (CAVU -- probably at the visual horizon or at least 10 miles from the target. Remember that the USS Liberty was one and one-half football fields long -- pretty easy to see on a flat ocean in clear weather conditions at mid-day.)
19) Set up a parallel approach to positively identify the target -- drive by and look her over. (Liberty's crew reported that a parallel approach was made.)
A) POSITIVELY IDENTIFY the target. This was extremely easy in the USS Liberty's case due to the enormous "Moon-Bounce" antenna carried on a very tall platform rising from the deck of the Liberty.
B) This single feature set her apart from any other type of ship.
20) If Egypt had one of these Moon-Bounce Equipped Intelligence Ships it would have been a FIRST DAY priority target known to every fighter pilot in the Israeli Air Force. Thus, the negative was also clear -- Israeli fighter pilots knew this ship was not Egyptian.
21) After the EYE CATCHING, clear and unique USS Liberty Moon-Bounce Antenna came many other obvious and unique AMERICAN features which made Liberty impossible to mistake for the "Egyptian horse carrier":
A) The Name "Liberty" on the stern
B) The unique "GTR 5" type/number painted on the bows.
C) The many other significant antenna structures all over the ship: Big "whips" & ELINT enclosures.
D) The American flag.
22) Upon the Israeli fighter pilot's POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION of the pre-authorized target, they would then turn to the final attack heading and establish approach parameters for the weapons selected and release their weapons. (Again, exactly as reported by the Liberty's crew.)
23) THESE ISRAELI FIGHTER PILOTS KNEW THEY WERE KILLING AMERICANS, AS DID THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MTBS THAT FOLLOWED IN THE COORDINATED ATTACK UPON THE CREW OF THE LIBERTY.
24) Again, the HUGE, unique, Moon-Bounce structure rising from the deck of the USS Liberty -- followed by all the other unique structures, markings and the FLAG.
25) Just think about driving down a street in an average neighborhood with sort-of similar houses, roof lines, and front yards -- except one house has an old-style 10foot diameter satellite antenna on the roof just above the front door and all kinds of HAM radio towers and antennas in the yard. BINGO: even the half-stoned Valley Girl with the room temperature IQ is going to exclaim: WOW, what is that?
26) When you consider the above information from a Tactical Fighter Pilot's perspective, and then look at what Cristol has written in his dissertation and his derivative book, you may have a better understanding of why I find his writing without substance.
The Liberty Incident.
The following is a summary of errors relating to the description of the employment of jet fighter aircraft in the unprovoked assault on the USS Liberty by Israeli military forces on June 8, 1967, as described by A.J. Cristol in his book entitled: The Liberty Incident.
Fog of War and the smoke and mirrors of A. J. Cristol
In his Preface, Cristol attempts to confuse the reader by misstating the facts of prior combat incidents involving Jet Fighter Aircraft in order set the stage for the Israeli position that Israel just made a little bitsy mistake when they killed or wounded 70% of the Liberty's American crew. Among the incidents Cristol describes as comparable mistakes to the Assault on the Liberty are the Turkistan and the Stark.
N O T E X A C T L Y.
The Turkistan was a Russian ship in the port of Cam Pha, North Vietnam, on June 2, 1967. Anti-aircraft guns fired from Cam Pha at American F-105s as they passed by en route to their target, as was the routine of the NVA gunners at Cam Pha. Returning from their target, the F-105s attempted to knock out the anti-aircraft guns firing from Cam Pha with 20 mm cannon ammo left over from the planned attack. In addition to the ground based NVA guns, the guns on the Russian Ship Turkistan were firing at the F-105s and one of our guys returned the favor. In his magnificent book Going Downtown, the War Against Hanoi and Washington, Col. Jack Broughton, USAF, describes the incident in detail and clearly avoids the term "accident." The pilot shot back at the ship on purpose. Missing from Col. Broughton's book is the statement that the ship fired on our guys first because that information was still classified when he wrote the book. In addition to the pilots' statements, we had pictures from a U2 showing the ship's guns firing, but again, this information was classified at the time he wrote the book.
A friend of mine was on the mission, he told me in no uncertain terms that the pilot shot at the ship that was firing at him. Not an accident as stated by Cristol.
The USS Stark was in the Persian Gulf in 1987. The USS Stark was hit by an Exocet, a long range, self guiding, anti-ship missile fired from a single seat fighter from a third rate air force, at night, whose pilot only saw a blip on a very small aircraft radar screen at long range, in a crowded sea. The pilot probably never saw the USS Stark until the missile hit the ship and exploded.
It is ludicrous for Cristol to equate the long range, radar initiated, missile hit at night on the Stark with the up close and personal, broad daylight, fly-by and then low altitude, level, strafing attack on the Liberty. Cristol's integrity is clearly in question by his deliberate attempt to equate the two.
His other examples are similarly flawed to the point of being little more than Cristol created smoke and mirrors.
Operating Jet Fighter Aircraft, circa 1967.
Page 42: Cristol claims that the aircraft that attacked the Liberty were "diverted" from other missions. Cristol's position is that the Liberty was not a planned target.
However, jet fighter aircraft of the period were gas hogs. A normal USAF tactical fighter training mission in 1967 was about 1.5 hours. Without air-to-air refueling, combat missions are often shorter due to the fuel consumed by the extra drag and weight of external weapons carried by tactical fighters. You plan to end the mission because you will be out of gas. The following statement makes no sense to me as the "diverted" fighters at the end of their mission were short on fuel and ready to return to base for necessary refueling. Logically, if they were about to return to base, they would not have the fuel to make the attack described by Cristol and the pilot:
"Kislev next looked over his airborne assets and noticed Kursa Flight, two Mirage IIICJ aircraft armed with 30mm guns and air-to-air missiles on combat air patrol over the Suez Canal and near the end of its time on station. Kursa's return route would take it over Point Boaz, just a few miles from El Arish and the Liberty. Kislev thus directed Kursa Flight to proceed towards El Arish and ordered the flight leader 'to bang,' or attack the target if it is a warship, warning the flight leader, but be careful, we have MTBs in the area."
The statement to attack "if it is a warship" seems incredulous to me. Attack any nation's warship? American, British, Italian, French or Russian? The paragraph does not make sense, as the Israeli pilot has just been ordered by his commander to commit an act of war against any nation who's warship might be there, and simultaneously commit a WAR CRIME of significant proportion.
Furthermore, compare Cristol's "diverted aircraft scenario" on page 42 with the description of the launch of "several flights" of Mirage fighter-bombers to attack suspected Egyptian Destroyers on the previous page, page 41.
"The air force pilots reported to General Hod that through the breaks in the clouds, they could see three wakes of ships moving at high speed. They asked for permission from General Hod to attack. Hod was on the telephone with Rear Admiral Erell, who was at the navy command center at Stella Maris in Haifa, and told Erell that his pilots had the enemy ships in sight and he wished to authorize the pilots to attack. Because this was a naval matter, protocol gave the navy the last word and Erell said no. Hod argued that his planes had limited fuel, and if they could not attack at once, he would pull them off. Erell insisted on illumination. Reluctantly, Hod ordered a plane to dive below the clouds and drop a flare. A moment later the flare illuminated the Eilat, the Jaffa, and the Haifa. There were no Egyptian ships. The radar blips had been false images, or 'ghosts.'"
This paragraph illustrates the limited fuel on board a fighter aircraft, even when the aircraft is launched in a fully fueled state to a specific target as was the situation here. General Hod's statement of limited fuel displays the fallacy of Cristol's contention that a flight of aircraft were diverted "near the end of their time on station" to attack the Liberty. Fighter aircraft "near the end of their time on station" are unlikely candidates, as it is technically improbable due to fuel constraints. Additionally, the ability of the Israeli fighter pilots (presumably at Cristol's same 600 kt airspeed) to immediately identify Israeli Destroyers at night, under a broken cloud layer, with only a single flare to illuminate all three ships, makes all Cristol's garbage about being unable to identify the USS Liberty in broad daylight appear as a pack of lies.
Page 42:
"The Kursa Leader orbited the Liberty looking for the 'Blue Max,' which was the identifying mark Israelis put on their hardware to help identify them as friendly. He did not see a flag on the ship. Kursa Flight Leader carefully sorted out the non-Israeli warship from the Israeli torpedo boats. Now he contacted air control for specific permission to attack. It was granted at 1355 subject to verifying that 'it is a warship.'"
Here Cristol's description of these pilots "carefully sorting" is very hard to understand, especially in light of the previous night identification under broken cloud cover using a flare. They have three little boats (not even called ships: see unnumbered photo page, two pages past page 173, for a picture of the Israeli MTB passing the Liberty) and this super big, odd looking ship, with huge numbers and letters on both sides of the bow, her name on her stern, funny looking antennas all over her and a gigantic dish antenna rising up from her deck (see gun sight picture on page 77). And no NAVAL CANNON WITH WHICH TO BOMBARD EL ARISH. The pilots IDs the little boats at 30kts but not the big ship at 5kts under a perfectly clear, broad daylight sky.
Page 43:
"Traveling at six hundred knots, the attacking aircraft'"
300 to 400kts is a more likely speed range of the attacking jet aircraft in the pattern with a weapons release speed possibly momentarily as high as the 450kt range, not the 600kts used by Cristol -- 600kts on the deck is very, very fast-- "Q" at 600kts indicated is probably beyond the capability of the Israeli napalm canisters. [US carriage limit at the time for napalm on the F-100 was 500kts. Ref: T.O. 1F-100D(I)-1] [The standard US 2.75FFAR LAU-3/A rocket launcher had a max employment speed of 450 kts and the pilot is warned that over 400 kts to expect the nose or tail cone to separate. The same warning was given for the LAU 32A/A and 32B/A Launchers. (Ref: USAF T.O. 1F-34C-1)
At 600kts indicated at low altitude, you are in the transonic range and all sorts of funny things are happening to your control surfaces. Most aircraft of the period got a little goosy in the transonic range . hard to keep the sight on target, even if you could go that fast with napalm cans and rocket pods. 600 knots on the deck is about Mach 0.90, well into the transonic range.
If the aircraft were "orbiting" and "rolled into shallow dives" at 600kts indicated airspeed as Cristol indicates on pages 42 and 43, the "orbit" circle with a 60 degree bank angle (2 G turn) is approximately six nautical miles in diameter (Ref: NAVAR 01-245FDD-1). Again, Cristol makes no sense from a tactical fighter pilot's viewpoint.
Page 45:
"There is some debate on whether rockets or missiles were fired by the aircraft It was the recollection of the Kursa flight leader on June 10, 1992, twenty-five years and two days after the event, that his Mirage carried a couple of air-to-air missiles."
The most important mission you have ever flown and you don't recall if you fired rockets? When a group of rockets come off of the wing, you get a real big picture . just plain Fourth-of-July spectacular. This poor boy, who later is promoted to brigadier general, can't recognize the American Flag, The name Liberty on the stern, the huge antenna farm on the ship, the big designating letters and number on the bows and whether he shot rockets. Give me a break. This guy must be related to the famous Sergeant Schultz whose line was: "I know nothing."
Page 45/46 Royal Flight: Two Super-Mystere B2 fighters:
"While the Flight Leader repeated this CTR 5 identification twice, he was in error because actually the first letter on the Liberty's Bow was G not C. At almost 600 miles per hour, this is an understandable mistake."
Well, here we are deep in the transonic range (600 knots) again, but with a different aircraft, and a big problem. Whereas the Mirage IIIcj, above, is a Mach 2 aircraft at altitude, the Super-Mystere is barely Mach 1 at altitude. The chance of the Super Mystere reaching 600 knots indicated while under control, maneuvering and carrying weapons at low altitude is really a stretch. Just not enough power.
The Super Mystere B2 was essentially a mini copy of the F-100. In my entire career (1970 to 1976), of rat-racing the F-100 I don't think I ever got close to 600 knots indicated, especially with external stores at low altitude. Even the most powerful western fighter of the day, the F-4 Phantom, could barely reach 500 knots indicated at sea level, with a full combat load using full military power. (55,000 pounds, drag index of 120, standard day, level flight, full military power, no afterburner. Ref: NAVAR 01-245FDD-1) Additionally, the Super Mystere's were the aircraft that reportedly carried napalm canisters and US napalm canisters, as well as many other US munitions, could not be subjected to more than 500 knots indicated at sea level on the F-100 Super Saber. [Ref: T.O. 1F-100D (I)-1]
Whether the pilot reported GTR-5 or CTR-5 is not of significance. Egyptian ships do not use either GTR-5 or CTR-5 to mark their ships. Egyptian ships use the Arabic alphabet. The author appears to wish to take the reader's mind off the real identifying aspects from the fighter pilot's perspective: The huge moon-bounce antenna structure and all of the other huge antennas all over the ship. The antennas are so significant that one of the pilots calls out to the other to watch out for the antennas . don't run into them! This state-of-the-art intelligence ship would have been a first day target for the Israeli's if it had belonged to the Egyptians.
Additionally, the USS Liberty and its intelligence gathering equipment and crew would have been an enormous prize as a state-of-the-art intelligence ship and would have been captured in tact by the Israeli's instead of torpedoed if she had been Egyptian and in her unprotected state. Six months later, the North Koreans did not shoot up the USS Pueblo any more than necessary to capture her . they wanted the goodies on the ship, as would have the Israelis if the USS Liberty was an Egyptian ship and a gift of the Soviet Union, as was much of Egypt's other armament at the time.
Page 47:
"One has to put yourself in ---in the shoes of the pilot. What is he told now? He's told now---he's not told to look for an American ship---he's not told to look for a French ship. He's told that there is an enemy warship that is running to the west, that the navy is chasing it, that it has shelled our positions, and now all he is told to do, please find it. And on top of that , he is told just to make sure it's that ship were talking about. It's not something else. That's all you have to do. More than that, I would say, we are telling him that there are no other military ships in the vicinity - so if you will be sure that it is a military ship, you can hit it."
This is an absurd line of reasoning. Tactical Fighter Pilots, as a class, are probably among the most intelligent, educated and independent of warriors. To suggest that these guys are some sort of unthinking automaton, gets to Cristol's silly-zone again. Hey dude, just shoot up any 'ol ship. Compare this statement to what Cristol wrote on page 42:
"Kursa Flight Leader carefully sorted out the non-Israeli warship from the Israeli torpedo boats."
Even the use of the word "warship" for an essentially unarmed converted transport is nuts. If you are looking for a ship that bombarded the shore, you would look for a ship with big guns . Huge guns that are a very major, unmistakable part of a true surface warship of the period. The main battery guns are so significant that the ship is essentially designed around the gun platforms, their magazines and related gear. No such guns on Liberty.
[Editor's note: It is also ludicrous to say that the Kursa Flight Leader "carefully" sorted out the Liberty from three small torpedo boats (not ships, boats!). Their comparative size is astounding and unmistakable.]
Page 47:
"Others in the Kirya who heard the report 'marked CTR 5' and who were aware that there were half a dozen Soviet intelligence gathering ships in the area, all of whose identification marks began with the letter C, were shocked and horrified that the target might be a Soviet ship!"
Why to worry? The pilot is quoted above indicating these same guys, who now wring their hands and warm their shorts, just a few minutes earlier gave the order to attack "any warship."
Illustration on the unnumbered pages following page 47: Flight pattern depiction of attacking Israeli aircraft. The patterns depicted by the artist do not illustrate what the USS Liberty crew saw, nor do they seem to agree with the previous statements regarding the identification passes prior to the weapons delivery passes and the "rolled into shallow dives" statement at the top of page 43. I would think that a "shallow dive" would be 5 to 15 degrees or so. A shallow dive angle that might be used to deliver strafe, rockets or napalm. You could also deliver these weapons "level" against a "vertical" target such as the Liberty.
Both the Kursa and Royal flights are depicted with dive angles essentially parallel to the sun elevation of 58 degrees. A 58 degree dive angle is a very steep dive angle. 60 degrees is the maximum dive angle normally practiced and for which sight mil settings and release altitudes were supplied during the period I flew tactical fighters. The USAF T.O. 1F-4C-34-1-1 does not even list dive angle sight and release altitude settings over for angles over 45 degrees. 60 degrees was used for Iron bombs (slicks) in an extraordinarily well defended target area such as might be found in the Hanoi, North Vietnam, area during this same period: not for napalm, normal strafe or rockets against an undefended target such as the Liberty and her crew. Furthermore, the patterns seem to illustrate aircraft with far more excess thrust available for very tight, close in, circular maneuvering than was available on aircraft of the period. One of today's Russian state-of-the-art vectored-thrust fighters might get close, but I doubt that even they could be expected to maintain the 600 kt pattern speed claimed by Cristol in the patterns depicted.
Page 73: Starting at the bottom of the page, Cristol presents an absurd series of statements regarding Liberty's US Flag. Cristol even goes so far in his random pattern of excuses as to present the argument that the Israeli pilots could have mistaken the US Flag on the Liberty for the Liberian Flag. So what? If the ship and crew had been Liberian, attacking under the circumstances, and doing little things like machine gunning the lifeboats was still a recognized War Crime of immense proportions.
Cristol goes on attempting to lead the reader down another rosy path. First, the author "gives" the Liberty the benefit of the doubt by allowing that the flag is held out by a breeze and thus in the best possible position to be recognized by the attacking Israeli pilots.
The author continues with his fantasy presentation providing totally irrelevant "facts" and argument to divert the reader's attention to the Flag as the most significant identification feature. He then attempts to destroy the Flag as a means of positive identification.
The author totally ignores the huge growth from the center of the ship -- that enormous, unique, Moon-Bounce Antenna which is 100 times the size and 1000 times the significance from a fighter pilot's standpoint for a POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION compared to the Flag. You could change the Flag, but that huge structure is not going to go away with a yank on a halyard. Also ignored are all the other identifying marks unique to Liberty: The name Liberty on the stern, and in addition to the Moon-Bounce antenna dish, the other huge antennas on the ship, ELINT enclosures, and the big designating letters and number on the bows.
On the second illustration following page 75: The artist illustrates: "What does a pilot see during a head on run at a ship?" In this illustration, I am wholeheartedly in agreement with Cristol. The huge antenna dish depicted on the bow of the ship and in the pilot's gun sight is exactly why the attack was premeditated murder by our Israeli "friends." After all, if you believe the Liberty was mistaken for an Egyptian horse carrier, I guess the big dish antenna must have been a watering dish for top-secret Egyptian Flying Horses, likely a derivative of previously top-secret Arab Flying Carpet Technology.
Note that these tactical fighter related arguments of Cristol's are totally baseless, and inherently contradictory in the same context. Cristol has presented an extraordinary amount of extraneous dribble to prove his incompetence in the subject matter.
At this point you wonder about how the glowing endorsements on the back page of the book were obtained. Foreign Affairs, Middle East Journal, Middle East Quarterly, The Miami Herald, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, and Donald Engen, former director, Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, all just bubble with joy over this book.
What is their common problem?
In summary, if one can believe Cristol, it would seem one must also believe that Israeli fighter pilots are so inept that upon seeing the Starship Enterprise, they would likely report to base that they had intercepted a 747 flying a Liberian flag of convenience.